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Abstract  
Hedge funds, as paragons of exploiting regulatory discrepancies, are heavily criticized for thwarting 
regulatory efforts to address systemic risk. This paper investigates arbitrage seeking behavior of 
hedge funds in the globally-fragmented financial regulatory framework. Regulatory arbitrage is 
viewed as an indispensible element of regulatory competition, which plays a significant role in 
delivering the benefits of regulatory competition by providing regulatory substitutes for regulated 
firms, thereby increasing the elasticity of demand for regulators and engendering regulatory 
accountability. 
Despite its benefits, regulatory arbitrage involve costs. Market discipline can constrain the negative 
externalities of regulatory arbitrage, however, this paper argues that due to certain idiosyncratic 
features of the hedge fund industry, such as sophistication of investor base, higher attrition rate, and 
lack of transparency, market discipline by itself cannot fully address the potential externalities of 
regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. These features weaken market signals and reduce the 
reputational advantages of being subject to high-quality regulation. The lower reputational costs in 
turn reduce the overall costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds compared with mainstream 
financial institutions, which makes it more likely for hedge funds to engage in regulatory arbitrage 
than other mainstream financial institutions do.  
In a departure from the mainstream research, which recommends regulatory coordination, 
cooperation, harmonization, and consolidation as legal remedies to address problems originating from 
regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds, this paper argues that such proposals are at best misguided and at 
worst systemic risk amplifier. Instead, this paper suggests that to reduce the likelihood of regulatory 
arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the strategies for regulating hedge funds should 
focus on indirect regulation of hedge funds through their counterparties, creditors and investors for 
which reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage tend to be significantly high. 
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In regulation of economic activities,1 the alternatives are no longer between the two polar extremes of 
laissez-faire capitalism and government central planning.2 The complexity of modern economies 
automatically boils down the alternatives to no more than one, i.e., a mixed economy within which 
free economic activities are intermingling with government intervention; together playing a major role 
in shaping economic incentives. Although, based on the dynamics of different economic systems, the 
level of government intervention ebbs and flows, the consequences of such interventions are not to be 
underestimated. One of the challenging problems arising from having a mixed economy in place is 
drawing the boundaries between regulated and unregulated markets on the one hand, and lightly 
regulated and heavily regulated markets on the other hand.3  
In addition, financial market globalization and the global reach of investment funds pose serious 
challenges to regulatory regimes and their responses to address potential systemic externalities of 
investment funds. Hedge funds are one of the global players of investment world, however, their 
regulatory framework remains local. The existing patchwork of financial regulatory regimes is 
particularly prone to regulatory arbitrage, which leads to circumvention of the specific mandates of 
individual regulatory regimes in the globally-fragmented financial regulatory system. Therefore, 
multinational firms have to operate their business in a patchwork of fragmented regulatory regimes at 
the global level. It is in such a context that regulatory arbitrage opportunities arise due to economic 
firms’ desire to maximize their profits by reducing their regulatory costs through exploiting the 
regulatory discrepancies which such a fragmented regulatory context creates. Hence, in addition to 
comingling regulated economic activities with unregulated ones,4 regulatory arbitrage is a by-product 
of fragmented regulatory systems. 
Regulatory arbitrage has as long a history as regulation itself and is as ubiquitous as economic 
regulation. The first instances of regulatory arbitrage are documented in the context of medical ethics5 
and taxation.6 In financial markets, the well-known example of religious prohibitions on interest 
                                                     
1 See Tobias Berg, Bernhard Gehra and Michael Kunisch, 'A Certification Model for Regulatory Arbitrage: Will Regulatory 
Arbitrage Persist under Basel III?' (2011) 21 The Journal of Fixed Income 39; Larissa Roxanna Smith and Víctor M Muñiz-
Fraticelli, 'Strategic shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act' (2013) 58 The Antitrust Bulletin 617 
2 Sanford Ikeda, Dynamics of the Mixed Economy: Toward a Theory of Interventionism (Routledge 2003)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
3 Charles Goodhart, 'The Boundary Problem in Financial Regulation' (2008) 206 National Institute Economic Review 48 
4 James W. McKie, 'Regulation and the free Market: The Problem of Boundaries' (1970) 1 The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 6 6 
5 Durant reports about the widespread presence of tax evasion in ancient Greece. The great lawgiver of ancient Athens, 
Solon, was criticized on the account that the strong and the clever could escape his laws by twisting those laws to their 
advantage. It is also well documented how Hippocratic code of medical ethics regarding abortion was systematically 
circumvented by physicians outsourcing the practice to midwives. (Modern equivalence of midwives in finance are the 
special purpose vehicles (SPV) designed to enjoy the exceptions from certain bankruptcy requirements (bankruptcy-proof 
financing)) Will Durant, The life of Greece: The story of Civilization, vol 2 (Simon & Schuster 2011) 
6 Not so far from Greece, Bartlett illustrates how differential tax treatment of citizens (especially small landowners) and 
slaves in the Roman Empire induced regulatory arbitrage. Since small landowner citizens were heavily taxed, and slaves 
were tax exempt, the citizens used to change their civil status from citizen to slave to avoid excessive taxation. He notes how 
despite increases in tax rates, the tax revenues decreased that in turn contributed to further decline of the Roman Empire. 
Bruce Bartlett, 'How excessive government killed Ancient Rome' (1994) 14 Cato Journal 287 300 
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sparked huge regulatory arbitrage activities. The advent of instruments such as Murabaha transactions 
and ijara wa iqtina (leasing and promise to gift) mechanism in Islamic finance,7 and of mechanisms 
such as dry exchanges (combio secco) and discretionary deposits8 were to circumvent the ban on 
Riba9 in Islamic finance and interest in Christianity.10 Regulatory arbitrage reached its zenith in the 
globalization and information age.11 In modern times, the globalization of trade and finance, gave 
traders more informational advantage. Coupled with the absence of global coordination, such a trend 
amplified the likelihood, magnitude, and frequency of regulatory arbitrage.12 
A hedge fund can be defined as a privately organized investment vehicle with a specific fee structure, 
not widely available to the public, aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of market 
movements (alpha)13 through active trading, and making use of a variety of trading strategies.14 Hedge 
                                                     
7 Michael S. Knoll, 'The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early History of Regulatory Arbitrage' (2008) 
87 Oregon Law Review 93 103  
It is also argued that most Islamic Finance instruments were invented to circumvent the restrictions that Sharia’ law places 
on Riba (interest) and Gharar (excessive uncertainty) in financial contracts. See Mahmoud A El-Gamal, Islamic finance: 
Law, economics, and practice (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
8 Tim Parks, Medici Money: banking, metaphysics and art in fifteenth-century Florence (Profile books 2013) 
9 In Islamic finance, it is believed Riba is different from the interest. See Abd al-Rahman Al-Jaziri, Al-Fiqh 'ala Al-madhahib 
Al-arba'a (Dar Ihya’ Al-Turath Al-‘Arabi 1986) See also Timur Kuran, The long divergence: How Islamic law held back the 
Middle East (Princeton University Press 2011) 
10 Ferguson demonstrates how Jews dominated the financial markets of the medieval Europe by interpreting the Bible in a 
certain way to circumvent its ban on interest. See Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (Penguin Books 2011) 
Kuran illustrates how the Middle East’s indigenous Christians and Jews came to dominate the most profitable and lucrative 
sectors of the local economy, especially in banking and insurance, through the choice of law. Such a freedom to choose to be 
subject to their own laws enabled them to escape the restrictions posed by Islamic economic institutions while Muslims 
themselves lacked such an option. Timur Kuran, 'Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical 
Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation' (2004) 18 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 71 72  
Indeed, it was impossible for Muslim to convert (punishable by death sentence) to other religion (restructure the business 
entity) and take advantage of other regulatory jurisdictions. However, such a reorganization or change in civil status was 
allowed in Roman Empire. 
11 Indeed, globalization reduced regulators’ powers by harnessing more regulatory arbitrage opportunities for firms, which 
disapprove of their regulatory policies of their jurisdiction. Jonathan R. Macey, 'Regulatory Globalization as a Response to 
Regulatory Competition' (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 1353 1357 
12 More recently, it is argued that regulatory arbitrage was one of the main reasons for the fall of the Glass-Steagall wall in 
1999. Viral V. Acharya, Paul Wachtel and Ingo Walter, 'International alignment of financial sector regulation' in Viral V. 
Acharya and Matthew Richardson (eds), Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System (Restoring Financial 
Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009) 368 More recently in China, since there have been 
strict restrictions on lending within China (China’s benchmark interest rate being 6%, the same rate in Hong Kong being 
0.5%), Chinese companies use trade finance instruments to borrow money offshore in a much lower interest rates. See Wei 
Shen, 'Competing for Renminbi: Financial Centers in the Context of Renminbi Globalization' in Ross P. Buckley, Emilios 
Avgouleas and Douglas W. Arner (eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation (Reconceptualising Global 
Finance and Its Regulation, Cambridge University Press 2016) 198 
The regulatory arbitrage activities are not limited to the prohibitions or caps on interest rates, it would happen in any other 
context. For example, in response to the recent tightening and enforcement actions against banking secrecy laws, it is argued 
that such policies might result in the rise of underground organizations that offer alternative unreported channels for funds 
which want to go unreported. Such restrictions on banking secrecy might even create incentive for the relocation of deposits 
to the least compliant heavens. See Ruth Plato-Shinar, 'Cross-Border Banking: Reconceptualising Bank Secrecy' in Ross P. 
Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas and Douglas W. Arner (eds), Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation 
(Reconceptualising Global Finance and Its Regulation, Cambridge University Press 2016) 249 See also Niels Johannesen 
and Gabriel Zucman, 'The end of bank secrecy? An evaluation of the G20 tax haven crackdown' (2014) 6 American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 65 
13 The alpha measures the excess return of a fund relative to a benchmark index. Simply put, the alpha shows by how much a 
hedge fund outperforms the markets, which can serve as a measurement of managerial skill. See William A. Roach Jr, 
'Hedge Fund Regulation- “What Side of the Hedges Are You on?' (2009) 40 The University of Memphis Law Review 165 
166 (arguing that generation of alpha is one of the significant features of hedge funds). 
14 For the definition of hedge funds, see Hossein Nabilou, 'The Conundrum of Hedge Fund Definition' (Forthcoming 2016) 
European Company and Financial Law Review  
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funds are historically viewed as paragons of exploiting regulatory discrepancies. Moreover, the recent 
global financial crisis triggered a debate about their contribution to the financial crisis. Thus far, there 
is an immense literature studying the potential systemic externalities of hedge funds. The debate about 
hedge funds and their role in the financial crisis easily lent itself to political abuse on both sides of the 
Atlantic.15 Although different explanations are presented for such an unprecedented regulatory 
animosity towards hedge funds,16 the post-crisis anti-hedge fund sentiment can partly be understood 
against a background of gaming regulatory regimes by hedge funds through engaging in regulatory 
arbitrage. 
This article proceeds as follows. First, the concept and dynamics of regulatory arbitrage is defined and 
analyzed. Second, regulatory arbitrage is explained in the context of regulatory competition, its 
virtues, in terms of delivering the benefits of regulatory competition, and it social costs or negative 
externalities is discussed. Third, the role of market discipline and government regulation in reducing 
the social costs of regulatory arbitrage is elucidated, and the reasons for the failure of market 
mechanisms to address the social costs of regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds are evaluated. Fourth, 
the role of public policy responses in constraining the negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage is 
discussed and the role of the indirect regulation in addressing such problems is highlighted. Fifth, it is 
concluded that the indirect regulation can better address the potential externalities of regulatory 
arbitrage by hedge funds. 
1. Regulatory arbitrage: the concept and dynamics 
The term arbitrage refers to “the exploitation of price differences between two goods that are 
essentially the same”.17 Arbitrage often takes place where the prices of identical goods are different in 
two different markets. In addition to the price differentials stemming from market inefficiencies, some 
of these differences arise from different regulatory schemes. To understand regulatory arbitrage, 
regulatory requirements should be viewed as the price of doing certain business activities in a 
particular jurisdiction. In this context, differential regulatory treatment of homogenous activities in 
different jurisdictions imposes differential costs on identical economic activities. Accordingly, the 
goods and services produced within two different jurisdictions will have different fixed costs. This 
difference in fixed costs will affect the price of final products and services. 
                                                     
15 Politicians demonized hedge funds as being ‘crazy’ and ‘hellish’4 which “fall like a plague of locusts" over the companies, 
"devour everything, then fly on to the next one.” (A statement quoted from Franz Müntefering, Germany's deputy 
chancellor, Sebastian Mallaby, 'Hands off hedge funds' (2007) 86 Foreign Affairs 91 92 
16 Romano argues that such a move toward regulating hedge funds is understandable in the traditional hostility against the 
short-selling activities. See: Roberta Romano, 'Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment' (2010) Working 
Paper No. 414 Yale Law & Econ  
17 Andreas Engert, 'Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation' (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law Review 329 357 
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A firm, which is free to choose between two jurisdictions with differential regulatory costs, will 
engage in doing business at lower regulatory costs (price). This practice is called regulatory 
arbitrage.18 Therefore, regulatory arbitrage, broadly defined, refers to shifting activities from a heavily 
regulated financial sector to an unregulated or lightly regulated financial sector with the aim of 
maximizing profits by taking advantage of regulatory differentials. In essence, regulatory arbitrage 
“exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory 
treatment”.19  
Regulatory arbitrage is one of the unintended consequences of effective regulation. Effective 
regulation is costly and “it is likely to penalise those within the regulated sector, relative to those just 
outside, causing substitution flows towards the unregulated.”20 Firms engaged in regulatory arbitrage 
are often doing so to avoid taxes, accounting standards, securities disclosure requirements, and other 
regulatory burdens.21 Although there are different mechanisms to engage in regulatory arbitrage, the 
most popular and apparently the least costly mechanism involves the manipulation of the structure of 
a deal.22 For instance, most financial derivatives were designed to take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities. Derivatives and strategies exploiting such market discrepancies allow market 
participant to circumvent financial regulations and tax burdens.23 
Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage may arise within one single jurisdiction or between two or more 
jurisdictions. ‘Intra-jurisdiction regulatory arbitrage’24 arises where one jurisdiction treats similar 
financial activities differently from other similar activities, thereby subjecting the same financial 
activities or methods to the governance of different rules. In the presence of such differential 
regulation if there are two methods of achieving the same outcome within one jurisdiction and one 
method costs less than the other, ceteris paribus, a profit maximizing firm will choose the method 
involving lower costs either by restructuring its legal entity (institutional engineering) or by shifting 
the business activities towards the method involving the least costs using legal and financial 
engineering. The latter form is achieved either by manipulating the design of the financial product or 
by changing the markets in which trades take place. Needless to say, both methods involve legal and 
financial engineering, which mainly involve the use of derivatives. 
It is well-acknowledged that one of the driving forces behind financial innovation has been financial 
regulation.25 Indeed, some financial innovations are “designed to keep regulators in the dark”.26 
                                                     
18 Ibid 
19 Victor Fleischer, 'Regulatory arbitrage' (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 227 229                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
20 Goodhart, 'The Boundary Problem in Financial Regulation' 
21 Fleischer, 'Regulatory arbitrage'  
22 Ibid 
23 Lynn A. Stout, 'Betting the bank: How derivatives trading under conditions of uncertainty can increase risks and erode 
returns in financial markets' (1995) 21 Journal of Corporation Law 53 57 
24 It seems that what Charles Goodhart dubs 'boundary problem' is the same as 'intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage'. 
25 Merton Miller, 'Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next' (1986) 21 Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 459 459 
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Financial regulation follows the logic and dynamics of influence and change in influencing the 
behavior of regulated industries. In this perspective, most financial innovations were strategic 
responses to regulations. Financial institutions have created an array of innovative derivative 
instruments to circumvent regulation or decrease the costs of compliance. For example, Gorton and 
Metrick identify regulatory changes as one of the major factors giving rise to shadow banks, the other 
being the private innovation.27 They attribute the rise of the shadow banking system to the regulatory 
and legal changes within the past four decades which gave advantage to three main categories of 
financial institutions; money-market mutual funds (MMMFs) which captured retail deposits from 
traditional banks, securitization which helped traditional banks to move assets off their balance sheets, 
and repurchase agreements (repos) which facilitated the use of securitized bonds as money. Needless 
to say, not only does shadow banking include MMMFs, but also it includes hedge funds, private 
equity funds, proprietary trading desks of traditional banks and other similar institutions essentially 
engaging in maturity transformation.28 
On the other hand, ‘inter-jurisdiction regulatory arbitrage’29 arises from differential regulatory 
treatment of identical business activities in different jurisdictions.30 In this case, absent international 
financial coordination, regulatory arbitrage may arise across national jurisdictions. The principle of 
sovereignty in international law, which entitles states to independently manage their internal 
economic affairs and excludes other nation-states from interfering in their domestic affairs, is the 
main reason for differential regulatory treatment of homogenous activities in different jurisdictions.31 
Regardless of its form, regulatory arbitrage is heavily criticized for neutralizing regulatory efforts to 
address systemic risks.32 
                                                                                                                                                                     
See also Frank Partnoy, 'Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage' (1996) 22 Journal of Corporation Law 
211 227 
26 Jean Tirole, 'Lessons from the Crisis ' in Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (eds), Balancing the 
Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis, Princeton 
University Press 2010) 29  
27 Gary B. Gorton and Andrew Metrick, 'Regulating the Shadow Banking System' (2010) Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 261 261  
28 Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'A Model of Shadow Banking' (2011) NBER Working Paper No 
1711  
29 In Charles Goodhart terminology, this would correspond to the ‘border problem’. See Charles A. E. Goodhart and Rosa 
M. Lastra, 'Border Problems' (2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 705 
30 Engert, 'Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation'  
31 Such an independent approach to domestic markets came under immense pressure with rising forces of globalization. In 
addition to the above considerations for differential regulatory treatment, the role of exogenous factors should not be 
overlooked. Factors, such as lobbying, are a permanent feature of financial regulation. For example, Partnoy argues that the 
structure of existing financial regulation is, in major part determined by the securities industry itself. He attributes the 
existence of regulatory exemptions mostly to the industry lobbying. See Partnoy, 'Financial Derivatives and the Costs of 
Regulatory Arbitrage' 
32 For example, Acharya and Richardson, believe that the regulatory capital arbitrage was at the heart of the recent financial 
crisis. See: Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, 'Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act' (2012) 4 Annual Review of 
Financial Economics 1 10. See also International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Risk Taking, Liquidity, 
and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess While Promoting Growth, October 2014) 89 
Stein identifies two economic driving forced for securitizations: risk-sharing and regulatory arbitrage. The collapse of the 
securitized markets in turn played a major role in financial crisis. See Jeremy C. Stein, 'Securitization, shadow banking & 




2. Causes of regulatory arbitrage 
In this section, the causes of regulatory arbitrage are discussed. There are two major causes for 
regulatory arbitrage, the first is the differential regulatory treatment of homogenous business activities 
and the second is the problems arising from legal interpretation. Differential regulatory treatment 
arises from financial market compartmentalization, regulatory competition and partial industry 
regulatory strategies.    
2.1. Differential regulatory treatment of homogenous financial 
activities 
It is often argued that similar institutions undertaking similar functions should be regulated 
similarly.33 Otherwise, a regulatory design, which treats identical activities differently, risks 
regulatory arbitrage. In other words, the abuse of regulatory loopholes by financial institutions is an 
unintended consequence of a regulation which treats identical activities differently, or a regulation 
that involves institutional regulation and treats homogenous institutions heterogeneously. Therefore, 
the main reason for regulatory arbitrage is the fragmentation of the regulatory structure throughout the 
globe and/or within a particular jurisdiction. 
Regarding the intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, the need for differentiated regulation creates 
regulatory bifurcation. Although there are benefits for subjecting identical firms and financial 
products to a single regulator such as coordination and ‘level playing field’ advantages, unequal and 
differential treatment of the identical components or subsets of an industry has its own proponents. 
For example, theories advocating regulatory competition and underscoring its efficiency-enhancing 
features34 can eventually lead to regulatory fragmentation. Needless to say, such a fragmentation can 
provide potential grounds for intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage. 
Differential regulatory treatment of homogenous financial activities has three major reasons; financial 
market compartmentalization which provides the ground for differential regulatory treatment,35 the 
benefits of regulatory competition which leads to the subjection of different firms to the governance 
of different rules,36 and the partial industry regulation theory which supports the differential regulation 
                                                     
33 Acharya and Richardson, 'Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act' 
34 Romano, 'Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment' 
35 In financial markets, institutional financial regulation tends to segment financial markets and institutions. For example, in 
most jurisdiction deposit taking and lending is a regulated activity in which only banks (depository institutions, or credit 
institutions) can engage. This by itself can result in market segmentation and can make banks special. See E. Gerald 
Corrigan, Are banks special?, 1982) 
36 For more information regarding the arguments for the regulatory competition by implementing competitive federalism 
approach, See Roberta Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation' (1998) 107 The Yale 
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to enhance competition among regulated firms.37 However, this paper focuses on regulatory 
competition and its role in encouraging hedge funds to engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
2.1 Financial market compartmentalization  
Financial regulation is a function of financial system itself and regulatory fragmentation is a product 
of financial market compartmentalization. Around three decades ago, Corrigan, among others, argued 
that banks are special and hence there is a need for special regulatory treatment for banks. In his view, 
offering transaction accounts, providing backup liquidity for all other financial and non-financial 
institutions, and banks’ role as a transmission belt for monetary policy were three features which 
distinguished them from other financial and non-financial institutions.38 Almost two decades later, 
accounting for the development of close substitutes for bank’s services,39 he repeated the same 
arguments with slight differences.40 Such an argument for bank ‘specialness’ presupposes that even 
accounting for dynamic behavior of different classes of financial institutions, the financial services 
industry can be compartmentalized.41 
This argument is based on the underlying reasoning that the nature and function of financial 
institutions differentiate one financial institution from the other. Therefore, due to their specialization 
in certain financial instruments and strategies, different financial institutions yield heterogeneous 
benefits, become subject to idiosyncratic risks, and impose different risks to the financial system.  
Contemporary history of financial regulation abounds with examples of fragmented regulation. For 
example, the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banking from investment banking and 
subjected commercial and investment banks to two different regulatory regimes and agencies (the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) respectively). Although the rationale behind such a separation was manifold, the most 
important reason was to prevent the conflicts of interest and inhibit the growing risk taking behavior 
stemming from the amalgamation of commercial and investment banking activities. In other words, it 
was argued that since investment banking is different from commercial banking in terms of its 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Law Journal 2359 See also Damien Geradin and Joseph A. McCahery, 'Regulatory co-opetition: Transcending the regulatory 
competition debate' in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur (eds), The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory 
Reforms for the Age of Governance (The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of 
Governance, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 2004) pp. 90 
37 This phenomenon is sometimes called regulatory bifurcation, See Erich Schanze, 'Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The 
Regulation of Markets That Have Escaped Regulated Markets' (1995) 151 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 162 162 
38 E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,[1982]), http://www.jura.uni-
augsburg.de/en/curriculum/summer_program/materials/material_2010/Corrigan_Are_Banks_Special.pdf                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
39 See for example:  Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 Journal of Banking & Finance 557 (1984)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
40 E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?: A Revisitation , 2000, , 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3527, However, other scholars do not agree with 
the ‘specialness’ argument for banks. See for example:  Anat R. Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers' New Clothes: 
What's Wrong with Banking and what to do about It (2013)         
41 Richard S. Carnell et al., The Law of Banking and Financial Institutions (4th ed. 2009)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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functions and potential risks, consolidation of these two activities together in one financial firm can 
create severe conflicts of interests. 
Likewise, the compartmentalization argument can be offered for differential regulatory treatment of 
hedge funds. For this purpose, differential treatment of hedge funds can best be understood in light of 
hedge funds’ specific functions in the overall financial system and their potential costs and benefits 
for the financial systems. Hedge funds occupy a relatively sui generis position in the financial system 
and provide financial systems with ‘special’ and idiosyncratic benefits that given the nature and 
function of other financial institutions they are unable to provide such benefits.42  
Hedge funds provide diversification benefits for financial markets.43 This means that investing in 
hedge funds can improve the risk-return relationship for investors. In addition, during periods of 
negative equity returns, investing in hedge funds can decrease the volatility of a portfolio by offsetting 
market movements.44 For example, an allocation of 10 to 20 percent of portfolio to alternative 
investments, which include hedge funds, is recommended as an ideal allocation of investments for 
pension funds that strive for a long-term strategy of low risk and low returns.45 
Moreover, hedge funds are sources of liquidity.46 This function of hedge funds is especially notable in 
niche markets and in times of liquidity crises.47 By investing in sub-markets that are “less liquid, more 
complex and hard-to-value,” such as convertible bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps 
markets, hedge funds can complete and deepen financial markets.48 In fact, the growth and 
development of some niche markets such as unsecured and subordinated debt in recent years is 
attributed to or correlated with the growth of hedge funds willing to take risks that other traditional 
financial institutions such as banks are unwilling to take.49  
In addition, hedge funds’ focus on generating alpha, which comes from outperforming markets, is 
mostly achieved through exploiting market imperfections and discrepancies.50 This function of hedge 
                                                     
42 Needless to say, these sui generis functions are made possible first and foremost by the special regulatory treatment of 
hedge funds by the financial regulators. 
43 Wouter Van Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective, 19 Financial Markets, 
Institutions & Instruments , pp. 275-278(2010)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
44 Thomas Schneeweis, Vassilios N. Karavas & Georgi Georgiev, Alternative Investments in the Institutional Portfolio, 
CISDM Working Paper Series (2002), available at 
http://www.intercontilimited.com/mfutsarchive/alternativesforinstitutions.pdf                                                                                                                                           
45 William F. Sharpe, Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement, 18 Journal of Portfolio 
Management 7 (1992)                                                                                                                                           
46 See Robert J. Bianchi & Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk, 19 Griffith Law Review , pp. 13-
15(2010). See also Francesco Franzoni & Alberto Plazzi, Hedge Funds’ Liquidity Provision and Trading Activity, (2012), 
available at http://www.people.lu.unisi.ch/franzonf/paper_27Nov2012_subm.pdf  
47 The provision of liquidity by hedge funds in niche markets became mostly possible because of the differential regulatory 
treatment applied to them in terms of the lack of limits on the amount of leverage, investment concentration, short selling, 
and use of structured products and derivatives. 
48 Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective, , pp. 275-278                                  
49 Bianchi & Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk, , pp. 13-15                                   
50 In fact, the lack of legal restrictions on hedge funds’ use of financial instruments, strategies, and their investment 
concentration enables them to use a wide range of techniques to exploit market imperfections. 
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funds is beneficial to financial markets, because it facilitates and accelerates the price discovery 
mechanism in financial markets by eroding arbitrage opportunities.51 Furthermore, the legal 
protections for hedge funds’ proprietary information induce them to invest in the acquisition of 
private information on which almost no disclosure requirement is imposed. Such an investment 
enables hedge funds to spot and exploit mispriced assets and securities that in turn can lead to more 
efficient markets by pushing the securities prices to their true or fundamental values.52 Moreover, such 
proprietary investment in information acquisition can significantly increase the role of hedge funds in 
disciplining the underperforming firms53 and in some cases uncovering fraudulent activities. 
Therefore, it is argued that the larger the number and the size of hedge funds, the more efficient the 
financial markets.54 
In addition, it is relatively easier for hedge funds to take contrarian positions in financial markets. 
Again, the unlimited use of leverage, short selling,55 limited investor liquidity (limited redemption 
rights or longer lock-ups), unlimited possibility of investment in derivatives, and unrestraint 
investment concentration potentially enable hedge funds to take positions in financial markets that 
other financial institutions cannot take due to their regulatory capital requirements. This contrarian 
function of hedge funds can smooth and reduce market volatility and reduce the number and volume 
of asset price bubbles.56 Not surprisingly, empirical evidence suggests that the leverage of hedge 
funds is countercyclical to the leverage of listed financial intermediaries, meaning that given the pro-
cyclicality of leverage in other financial institutions, hedge funds’ leverage has an inverse relationship 
with the leverage of other major financial market participants.57 In other words, when the leverage of 
the mainstream financial institutions increase during a financial boom, the leverage of hedge funds 
tend to decrease, while in the financial bust or credit crunch, the leverage of mainstream financial 
institutions decrease while hedge fund leverage tend to increase. This feature coupled with the 
unlimited capability of hedge funds to leverage their contrarian positions amplifies the effects of such 
positions. As a result, contrarian position taking by hedge funds can smooth the volatility of financial 
markets. Indeed, the nature of hedge funds’ contrarian strategies enables them to be active traders 
during financial crises. This feature of hedge funds can potentially form a price floor in distressed 
                                                     
51 Andrew Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, in Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge 
Funds , p. 22Anonymous Banque de France ed., 2007)                                                                                                                                                     
52 William A. Roach Jr., Hedge Fund Regulation- “What Side of the Hedges are You on? 40 The University of Memphis 
Law Review , p. 173(2009-2010)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
53 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, SSRN Working Paper 
Series (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577                                                                                                                                           
54 Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, , pp. 22-23                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
55 In order to take a short position, the trader usually borrows the securities from a dealer and sells them to the market with 
the expectation that price of the securities will be lower at certain point in the future at which the trader will again buy them 
back and return them to the dealer. By doing so, the short seller pockets the difference between higher sale price and lower 
purchase price at which he has bought them back and returned them to the dealer. 
56 Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective, , pp. 275-278                                       
57 This means that hedge funds can be liquidity providers in times of liquidity crunch. See Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy & 
Gregory B. van Inwegen, Hedge Fund Leverage, 102 Journal of Financial Economics 102 (2011). Their empirical study 




markets. Financial institutions such as banks cannot play such a role especially because of the Basel-
like capital adequacy requirements (CARs) to which all depositary institutions are subject.58 
Therefore, hedge funds provide a significant stabilizing influence by providing liquidity and spreading 
risks across a broad range of investors.59 
More importantly, hedge funds’ investor base and the mechanisms used to lock-up capital for longer 
periods enable hedge funds to sustain their contrarian positions against market perceptions and 
movements.60 Unlike mutual funds and banks, hedge funds are not required to redeem the investment 
on investor demand or within a very short period of time. The right to redeem in alternative 
investments is often governed by private contracts which may impose a longer lock-up periods on 
investors’ capital. In particular, gates and side-pocket arrangements within the purview of private 
ordering provide an additional tool for hedge funds to restrict investor liquidity. This freedom from 
liquidity constraints gives hedge funds additional tools and techniques to better manage liquidity risk, 
and enables them to have long-term horizons in their investment strategies.61   
All in all, hedge funds can substantially contribute to “capital formation, market efficiency, price 
discovery, and liquidity”.62 Regulatory agencies have consistently acknowledged the benefits of hedge 
funds to financial system.63 Even after the financial crisis, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) suggested that hedge funds should be compensated for their intermediary 
functions and willingness to take such risks that other financial market participants are unwilling to 
take.64  
Not only do hedge funds’ special functions and benefits make them special in financial systems, 
thereby requiring special regulatory treatment, but also design-based ex-ante regulation of hedge 
funds justifies their differential regulatory treatment. By design, hedge funds have limits on the 
number and qualifications of their investor base. For example, regulatory requirements for hedge fund 
investor base rules out any further regulation on the grounds of investor protection, while such an 
                                                     
58 Jón Daníelson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, in Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge Funds 
, p. 30Anonymous Banque de France ed., 2007)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
59 Jean-Pierre Mustier & Alain Dubois, Risks and Return of Banking Activities Related to Hedge Funds, Banque De France, 
Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge Funds , pp. 88-89(April 2007)                                                                                     
60 Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, , p. 22                                           
61 In terms of maturity transformation, hedge funds stand in between banks, mutual funds (with higher maturity 
transformation) on the one hand, and the pension funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds on the other hand. 
Despite arguments to the contrary, it seems that hedge funds play a limited role in liquidity transformation. See Eechoud et 
al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective, , pp. 275-278                                
However, it is suggested that recently hedge fund are engaging more and more in liquidity transformation.  Jennifer Payne, 
Private Equity and its Regulation in Europe, 12 European Business Organization Law Review , p. 573(2011)   
62 Roach Jr., Hedge Fund Regulation- “What Side of the Hedges are You on? , p. 173                                               
63 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission,[September 2003]), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
64 Bianchi & Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk, , pp. 13-15                                               In this perspective, 
the special regulatory treatment of hedge funds can be considered as a compensation package for hedge funds’ benefits to the 
financial system such as liquidity provision in illiquid markets, helping the price discovery mechanism to become more 
efficient, risk distribution, contribution to financial integration, and diversification benefits. 
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argument does not hold for banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies. This is 
mainly because the investors in these financial institutions are unsophisticated.  
On the other hand, the choice of organizational form (LLP or LLC) automatically triggers certain 
mandatory rules such as general partners’ (managers’) co-investment in hedge funds and their 
potential liability. These features substantially align managers’ incentives with the interest of the 
investors in hedge funds. If not circumvented one way or another, such an organizational form 
automatically rules out the need for imposing corporate governance standards on hedge funds that are 
required for banks and mutual funds. 
To summarize, hedge funds play a sui generis role in financial markets. Needless to say, sustaining 
such benefits and addressing potential risks of hedge funds to financial markets call for their special 
regulatory treatment.65 In addition to compartmentalization, two other factors contribute to the 
regulatory bifurcation of hedge funds around the globe, i.e., regulatory competition and partial 
industry regulation that will be discussed below.  
2.2 Regulatory competition 
Prior to the information age and globalization, competition among regulators to attract more 
businesses was not as fierce as it is in the globalization era.66 With increased waves of globalization, 
flow of information, and emphasis on the free movement of goods, services, labor and capital, the 
capital like “water runs to find its level”67 with an unprecedented pace. It is in this context that the 
race to attract more businesses started among turf-seeking regulators. 
Regulatory competition is further accelerated by greater technological improvements, use of the 
internet, globalization of finance, and increasingly diminishing transaction costs which make the 
financial transactions being processed in a matter of a second. In such ‘hyper-connected’68 global 
markets, investors become an ‘economic herd’69 capable of shifting their business across the 
regulatory borders instantaneously. Such an opportunity for taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage 
                                                     
65 Needless to say, this differentiation requires different regulatory treatment for different financial institutions (positive 
feedback loop or positive reinforcing loop-- differentiation breeds tailor-made regulation and tailor made regulation 
amplifies differentiation). On the other hand, the special regulatory privileges (subsidies) offered to banks justified a separate 
set of regulations for them. (Deposit insurance, and having the access to Fed's discount window (LOLR)). Therefore 
differences in functions, regulatory framework (such as tax treatments, subsidies (deposit insurance), organization breeds 
more differential regulatory treatments and more differential regulatory treatments makes financial markets more 
compartmentalized. (positive feedback loop) 
66 Regulatory competition has a long history, perhaps longer than regulatory arbitrage. The historian Will Durant reports that 
in Ancient Athens, to stimulate commerce and industry, Solon started granting citizenship to skillful foreign businessmen 
and their families. Durant, The life of Greece: The story of Civilization Ferguson demonstrates how unitary government and 
uniformity led to stagnation in ancient China, whereas competition between national jurisdictions in divided Europe 
contributed to the long term development and subsequent domination of Europe. Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the 
Rest 
67 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street (H.S. King 1873) 
68 Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That used to be us: How America fell behind in the world it invented and 
how we can come back, vol First (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011)   
69 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (Random House INC. 2000) 
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opportunities in an unprecedented pace increased regulatory competition. First instances of such 
competition for businesses are reported across states boundaries in federal jurisdictions in the U.S. 
This might very well explain why the theory of regulatory competition is so inextricably intertwined 
with the debate about federalism. It was against such a background that regulatory competition 
emerged as an ‘economic theory of government organization’.70 
The question is that while a unitary or a consolidated regulator can more consistently regulate 
business activities, why there is a need for regulatory competition creating gaps and fractures in the 
system which can be exploited to the detriment of regulators? Given the public goods nature of 
regulation,71 in the regulatory competition literature, the original model of provision of public goods 
has been adapted to explain government output of regulation. Indeed, in the theory of regulatory 
competition, the provision of laws and regulations is similar to the provision of goods and services by 
economic firms. These models assume that governments are suppliers of regulation similar to 
suppliers of products and services in the marketplace, and they should be disciplined by the same 
forces.72 
As an analogy to local governments, local jurisdictions are supposed to compete for scarce economic 
resources the financial market equivalent of which is capital. In the quest for more capital and serving 
the best interest of their constituents (or extending their regulatory turf), local regulators are supposed 
to offer the best quality of regulation to attract more customers (regulated entities). Advocates of 
localism argue that the very existence of localities and states generates plurality and extends the 
choices and opportunities of citizens to move into better localities that provide a better allocation of 
services and taxes, and eventually serves the economic efficiency.73 Charles Tiebout’s seminal work 
was the prototype of the argument for localism elaborating the idea of ‘voting with the feet’ for 
citizens who are dissatisfied with the provision of local public goods in a specific state or locality.74 In 
this model, the national or state governments (within a federal framework), which provide the optimal 
level of regulation, are supposed to attract more mobile economic resources.  
                                                     
70 Geradin and McCahery, 'Regulatory co-opetition: Transcending the regulatory competition debate' 
71 The need for regulation arises from market failure. The aim of such regulation should be correcting market failures and 
imperfections. Regulation itself has a public goods feature and in the absence of third party action, it will not be provided or 
it will be underprovided. The public goods nature of provision of regulation suggests that the government having monopoly 
over ‘the legitimate use of force within the given territory’ has to take action to provide it. As the public goods nature of 
regulation suggests, its rise and the method of its study can be investigated similarly to the other systems of provision of 
public goods. As the government has the monopoly on the provision of such public goods which requires taking certain 
actions which private parties cannot, it seems very counterintuitive to speak of the regulatory competition especially within 
the unitary states. See Tyler Cowen, 'Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy' (1992) 8 Economics and 
Philosophy 249 249  
72 One of the first systematic studies of provision of public goods is conducted in the American local government context 
focusing on the debate about localism vs. regionalism and the state vs. federal government dichotomy context. 
73 Sheryll D. Cashin, 'Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan 
America' (2000) 86 Cornell Law Review 729 753 
74 Charles M. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures' (1956) 64 Journal of Political Economy 416 416 
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In such a context, a unitary regulator is a monopolist and regulatory harmonization or consolidation of 
regulatory regimes is regarded as regulatory cartelization which should result in stifling competition 
and leading to inefficiencies. In contrast, a system consisting of multiple decentralized regulatory 
agencies competing for customers (economic firms) is supposed to result in more efficient results, 
namely enhanced quality of regulation with competitive prices.75 For example, it is argued that ‘the 
incessant turf battles’ between American financial regulatory authorities is an equivalent of the 
competition among private businesses which disciplines regulators by the threat of loss of their 
market share (regulatory clientele) to other agencies, thereby promoting regulatory diligence and 
competence among regulators.76 
Advocates of regulatory competition often appeal to the arguments in favor of decentralization. 
Decentralization mitigates information asymmetries, reduces the likelihood of regulatory capture, and 
encourages more experimentation which allows for alternative solutions for similar problems.77 It also 
induces more innovation, differentiated and customized services adapted to local circumstances and 
the needs of the constituency. The decentralized model of provision of public goods increases 
economic efficiency by satisfying the differential preferences in the locally needed public goods.78 
Therefore, since the efficient level of output in local public goods is varied in different local 
jurisdictions, governments can provide a better allocation of local services in a decentralized 
structure.79  
In the same vein, regulatory arbitrage plays an important role in delivering the benefits of regulatory 
competition. In contrast to unitary regulatory systems or regulatory monopolies in which the demand 
for regulation is inelastic, regulatory arbitrage provides regulatory substitutes for regulated firms and 
thereby makes the demand for regulation elastic. The elasticity of demand for regulatory services 
from the regulated firms is a function of the alternative regulatory systems available to them.80 In the 
harmonized regulatory system, the demand for regulatory services will be constant (high), while in the 
regulatory fragmentation model, ceteris paribus, the demand increases with more harmonization and 
decreases with more fragmentation. Therefore, harmonized regulatory jurisdictions will be less 
accountable and fragmented jurisdictions will be more accountable to their regulated firms.  
                                                     
75 Geradin and McCahery, 'Regulatory co-opetition: Transcending the regulatory competition debate' 
76 Richard S. Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of Banking and Financial Institutions (4 edn, 
Aspen Publishers 2009) 65 
77 Geradin and McCahery, 'Regulatory co-opetition: Transcending the regulatory competition debate' 
78 Richard Briffault, 'Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government Law' (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 1 5 
79 Wallace E. Oates, 'An essay on fiscal federalism' (1999) 37 Journal of economic literature 1120 1121 Although devolution 
and decentralization which can encourage competition is more likely to generate efficient results, just as markets, there are 
two conditions for the achievement of goals in such a model of regulatory competition. First, there should be no 
externalities. And secondly, markets should be and remain open for free entry and exit of capital and labor. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, 'Federalism and European business law' (1994) 14 International Review of Law and Economics 125 125 
80 Macey, 'Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition' 
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Such a dramatic change in the elasticity of demand means that if regulators cannot provide good 
quality regulations in competitive prices, they will be deserted by regulated firms. Hence, this 
increased elasticity of demand engenders more regulatory accountability towards their clientele. On 
the other hand, this market or ‘downward accountability’81 will impose constraints on regulators and 
can guard against corruption in regulatory systems. That is why regulatory competition is proposed as 
a safeguard against regulatory capture.82 Since regulators have an incentive to increase their market 
share of regulated entities,83 and their response to regulatory arbitrage will tend to at least maintain 
their existing regulatory turf, regulatory competition and the possibility of regulatory arbitrage will 
operate as a check on the regulatory despotism by enabling the regulated firms to rid themselves of 
inefficient regulators.  
In addition, enhanced diversity among regulators can be effective in avoiding the conflicts of interest 
in regulatory functions.84 By the same token, in the context of financial markets and hedge fund 
regulation, regulatory competition may create a less-friendly environment for the evolution of 
cooperation and corruption between regulators and regulated firms. This may be attributed to the peer 
pressure among regulators that can decrease the likelihood of the evolution of corruption.  
Additionally, regulatory competition provides market benchmarks or yardsticks against which the 
regulatory oversight of each regulator can be assessed among different groupings in a regulatory 
tournament (yardstick competition).85 Such an arrangement for monitoring regulators is similar to 
mechanisms long used in the labor contracts. In labor contracts and especially in franchise 
agreements, the franchisor (regulator) is not able (or it is not cost-justified for her) to monitor the level 
of effort (input) of the franchisee, whereas the level of output is readily observable. In such a context, 
                                                     
81 Colin Scott, 'Accountability in the Regulatory State' (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 38 38 
82 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate (Oxford University Press 
1992) Findings by Grabosky and Braithwaite’s (1986) show that regulatory agencies that regulate “(1) smaller numbers of 
client companies; (2) a single industry rather than diverse industries; (3) where the same inspectors were in regular contact 
with the same client companies; and (4) where the proportion of inspectors with a background in the regulated industry was 
high” are more likely to have a cooperative rather than prosecutorial regulatory practice. The empirical findings in that 
regard confirm the theory that “the evolution of cooperation should occur only when regulator and the regulated firm are in a 
multi-period prisoner’s [sic] dilemma game. Repeated encounters are required for cooperation to evolve.” 
When an agency regulates a small number of firms in a single industry, the likelihood of the repeated encounters is greater 
which can pave the way for cooperation and corruption. Ibid 
83 Macey, 'Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition' 
84 Cristie L. Ford, 'Principles-based securities regulation in the wake of the global financial crisis' (2010) 55 McGill Law 
Journal 257 257 
Some scholars raise questions about regulatory arbitrage argument. For example, Zingales argues that since managers, rather 
than the shareholders are to choose regulators, such a regulatory regime based on choice of regulators made by managers can 
potentially suffer from severe agency problems. See Luigi Zingales, 'The Future of Securities Regulation' (2009) 47 Journal 
of Accounting Research 391 400 
On the other hand, it is suggested that regulatory competition may give rise to a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ competitive approach 
to regulation and absent financial regulatory coordination, create regulatory arbitrage opportunities for the firms inducing 
‘regulatory race to the bottom’ which enables financial institutions to circumvent effective financial regulation. See James R. 
Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr and Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern (Cambridge University Press 
2006) See also Acharya, Wachtel and Walter, 'International alignment of financial sector regulation'  
In addition, there is a trade-off between regulatory capture and regulatory harmonization. Features of regulatory competition 
that induce regulatory arbitrage decrease the likelihood of regulatory capture. On the other hand, the regulatory 
harmonization can decrease the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage while inducing the likelihood of regulatory capture.  
85 Andrei Shleifer, 'A theory of yardstick competition' (1985) 16 The Rand journal of economics 319 
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there are several methods to deal with this information asymmetry problem, such as ‘cost-of-service’ 
regulation and ‘lagged price adjustment’ mechanisms. However, both of these mechanisms can be 
equally inefficient.86 Shleifer suggests that in such a setting, yardstick competition, can achieve a 
more efficient outcome than the alternatives.87 
Where competition involves political agents, the tournament can be adopted in the regulatory 
competition with the focus on competition between governments or regulators. Such an application 
rests on the assumption that the voters (regulated firms) lack full information about the quality of the 
input of politicians (regulators) and that they use other politicians’ performance as a yardstick or 
benchmark to evaluate the performance of their own politicians.88 
Likewise, there are several studies emphasizing the welfare-enhancing feature of regulatory 
competition in financial regulation.89 For example, regulatory competition among accounting 
standards and the availability of the choice of regulators and different formats for corporations within 
and across international boundaries would improve the efficiency of the corporate governance and 
accounting standard setting and practices, and would eventually lead to lower cost of capital. Thus, 
competitive accounting regimes are more efficient than monopolistic accounting regimes both 
domestically and internationally.90 Moreover, such a cross-country regulatory competition can provide 
alternatives for financial institutions to evade costly regulations resulting in improvements in capital 
markets’ allocative efficiency and enhancing global economic growth.91 
Despite the benefits of regulatory competition and regulatory arbitrage, they also involve (social) 
costs or externalities. The most important aspect of regulatory arbitrage involving externalities is the 
systemic externalities that regulatory arbitrage opportunities can impose on financial markets. In the 
aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, benefits of regulatory competition and the underlying 
rationale that regulatory competition would result in migration of firms to better regulatory 
jurisdictions or at least it does not result in regulatory race-to-the-bottom are questioned.92 
                                                     
86 Ibid The equivalent of the ‘cost-of-service’ regulation for regulating regulators is pegging regulator’s pay to her 
performance (estimating the costs of performance and paying them accordingly), and the equivalent of the ‘lagged price 
adjustment’ is the deferred compensation schemes for regulators. 
87 See ibid  
Recent studies find how incentive based pay schemes outperform fixed pay and how tournament theory is less effective than 
piece rate in certain settings. For more details, See M. Ali Choudhary, Vasco J. Gabriel and Neil Rickman, 'Individual 
Incentives and Workers' Contracts: Evidence from a Field Experiment' (2012)  
88 William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, 'The new economics of jurisdictional competition: Devolutionary 
federalism in a second-best world' (1997) 86 The Georgetown Law Journal 201 256 
89 For more information regarding the reasons for the regulatory competition by implementing competitive federalism 
approach, see Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation' 
90 Shyam Sunder, 'Regulatory competition among accounting standards within and across international boundaries' (2002) 21 
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 219 219  
91 Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin and Yue Ma, 'Regulatory arbitrage and international bank flows' (2012) 67 The Journal of 
Finance 1845 1846  
92 Joel P. Trachtman, 'The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation' 
(2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 719 719  
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2.3 Partial industry regulation 
In addition to the arguments offered for the differential regulation on the grounds of industry 
compartmentalization and regulatory competition, there is an additional argument for differential 
treatment of homogenous economic activities. Ayres and Braithwaite advocate ‘partial-industry 
regulation’ (PIR).93 PIR means that “government regulates only a part of the industry, leaving another 
part unregulated.94 Under the partial-industry regulatory schemes, government purposefully treats 
firms in an industry differently.”95 This regulatory strategy is viewed as a middle path between full-
industry regulation (FIR) and laissez-faire policies seeking to take full advantage of the virtues of 
both systems. The proponents of this approach argue that in some regulatory settings “regulating only 
an individual firm (or a subset of the firms) in an industry can promote efficiency by avoiding the 
costs associated with industry-wide intervention or laissez-faire”.96 
In contrast to regulatory competition that aim of which is to enhance competition among regulators, 
the aim of PIR is to stimulate competition within the regulated industry. In other words, PIR 
strategies’ goal is to harness the competitive forces of the market in order to enhance market 
discipline. The main point of this approach is that it can use regulated firms to affect a behavioral 
change in other firms in that industry. In addition, this diversified regulatory approach (which 
sometimes is called ‘regulatory bifurcation’)97 can provide additional advantages such as mitigating 
the adverse effects of regulatory errors, providing a competitive check on the decisions of regulatory 
agencies by preserving the independence of unregulated firms,98 and inducing the monitoring 
mechanism among regulated firms. Indeed, in such a scheme, the regulated and unregulated sections 
of an industry can check one another’s abuses. Such a regulatory scheme can eventually harness the 
‘market accountability’ or ‘downward accountability’. Put differently, PIR can be viewed as a form of 
regulatory delegation or indirect regulation in which regulated firms can ensure that the unregulated 
firm will comply.99 However virtuous the PIR strategies are, their eventual result is a ‘dual 
governance of individual markets’.100 
                                                     
93 See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 
Calif. Law Rev. 13 (1992a) See also Ayres & Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate, , 
Chapter 5. 
94 Ayres and Braithwaite also argue that the objections to the PIR based on the concerns about fairness of treating firms 
differently, predicated upon the equal protection clause, are unfounded. See Id.                   
95 Id.                                                                                                                                     
96 Ayres & Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 13 , See also Ayres 
& Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate, , Chapter 5. 
97 See Erich Schanze, Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The Regulation of Markets that have Escaped Regulated Markets, 151 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 162 (1995)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
98 Ayres & Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate, , p. 137                   
99 Ayres and Braithwaite identify three forms of partial industry regulation: dominant-firm strategies, fringe-firm strategies, 
and tournament competition strategies. Built on tournament theory, yardstick competition derives some benchmarks from the 
average industry performance and rewards the firms passing the benchmarks. For example, in labor contracts and especially 
in franchise agreements, the franchisor is not able (or it is not cost-justified for her) to monitor the level of effort of the 
franchisee, however, she can observe the level of output. Shleifer suggests that under certain assumptions, the yardstick 
competition can achieve an efficient outcome in this setting. See Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, , pp. 319-320                                      
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Therefore, this regulatory bifurcation results in two separate playing fields which are subject to 
separate rules of the game.101 The dual governance, though beneficial, is not without costs. The main 
problem is that such a system of regulation stimulates strategic responses by the firms to the 
regulatory fragmentation of the industry. Profit maximizing firms in such a segmented regulatory 
system will seek to shift or restructure their business in order to fall under the least costly regulatory 
regime. 
By creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, regulatory bifurcation and regulatory competition 
can inhibit the cooperation among regulators to effectively address externalities in financial 
markets.102 Indeed, it is argued that absent more coordination between regulators, such regulatory 
arbitrage may undercut the attempts to limit excessive risk taking in financial markets.103 
2.4 Definitional Problems, Legal Interpretation and Regulatory 
Arbitrage 
An additional major source of regulatory arbitrage lies in the nature of compliance and enforcement of 
law. Indeed, the exploitation of gap between economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory 
treatment is made possible because of “legal system's intrinsically limited ability to attach formal 
labels that track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision”.104 Such a limited ability 
breeds opportunities for technical compliance with the rules and regulations that can undermine the 
underlying spirit and the purpose on which the entire regulatory system or a specific law is built. 
Compliance of this sort, dubbed ‘creative compliance’, is well documented in the regulation 
literature.105 It involves “using the law to escape legal control without actually violating legal 
rules”.106 What allows firms to engage in creative compliance lies in the nature of legal rules, i.e., the 
‘open texture’ of the law. This feature of law arises from the limits “inherent in the nature of language 
to the guidance which general language can provide”107 stemming in turn and partly from the ‘relative 
                                                                                                                                                                     
For example, as a cost-cutting strategy, the franchisor, who franchises the activities to several firms, can create a yardstick 
for the costs of the firms based on the average costs of other similar firms and create a competitive environment by 
announcing to franchisees that the firms with less costs than the benchmark can win certain prizes. Therefore, such a 
tournament design can create an environment in which the firm’s profits will depend on its ability to achieve certain output 
levels with lower costs than its competitors. This kind of intervention makes suppliers’ profits dependent on the conduct of 
their competitors. See Ayres & Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate, , p. 138                 
100 Id.                                                                                                                                     
101 Helen A. Garten, US Financial Regulation and the Level Playing Field (2001)                                                                                                                                          
102 Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, , pp. 366-367                                                                         
103 Acharya, Wachtel & Walter, International Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, 365 See also Houston, Lin & Ma, 
Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows, , p. 1848                                                                           
104 Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, , p. 229                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
105 See:  Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (2004)                                                                                                                                                         
106 D. McBarnet & C. Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 Modern 
Law Review 848 (1991)                                                                                                                                                         
107 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed. 1994)                                                                                                                                                           
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ignorance of fact[s]’ and ‘relative indeterminacy of aims’.108 The type of regulatory arbitrage 
stemming from the legal engineering that aims to exploit the gaps and loopholes arising from legal 
interpretation oftentimes occurs within a single jurisdiction. 
Apart from the cognitive and inherent linguistic limitations, the choice of a particular method of 
interpretation in financial regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can significantly affect the 
problems arising from boundaries set out in the financial system. One of the sources of regulatory 
arbitrage is associated with ‘legal formalism’. Legal formalism is usually understood as following the 
literal mandates of a rule, even if it ill serves its purpose. “Formalism implies a narrow approach to 
legal control – the use of clearly defined, highly administrable rules, an emphasis on uniformity, 
consistency and predictability, on the legal form of transactions and relationships and on literal 
interpretation.”109 Such an approach usually does not recognize “necessity of choice in penumbral 
areas of rules”.110 
This paper argues that the appeal to the literal meaning of words in legal interpretation can be used to 
circumvent the very purpose of law.  
The aim of creative compliance is to avoid legal control by appealing to formalism in legal 
interpretation, which is a relatively dominant approach in legal thinking and jurisprudence.111 The 
emphasis on literal interpretation highlights the role of definitions in legislation and rule making. The 
emphasis on the definitions constitutes a platform from which many of the intra-jurisdictional 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities can potentially be launched. Needless to say, rules-based regulation 
(as opposed to the principles-based regulation the focus of which is on ‘goals’ rather than the ‘means’ 
of achieving goals) creates vast opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. As McBarnet argues, 
“definitions and criteria involving clear rules or thresholds make particularly valuable material for 
legal engineers to work on.”112 
Regarding hedge funds, for example, problems in their legal definition can sterilize regulatory 
attempts to address their potential systemic risks. Hedge funds have an established notoriety for 
placing themselves out of regulatory purview and circumventing regulations by relying on legal 
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technicalities and definitions. In fact, hedge funds define themselves by regulatory exemptions by 
making room for themselves in the hodgepodge of general rules and exemptions thereof. This means 
that they do not have a shape of their own, and should mostly be defined by the exogenous effects of 
regulations affecting their overall shape. This dynamic aspect of hedge funds increasingly deepens the 
gap between the reality of hedge funds and their etymological roots. Therefore, the term ‘hedge fund’ 
by itself can provide no clue for its appropriate regulatory definition. In addition, the responsive 
strategies of hedge funds to regulation induce every ‘otherwise non-hedge fund investment pool’ to 
circumvent the restrictions of regulation by taking refuge under hedge fund definitional umbrella. 
This move to acquire hedge fund status and make use of statutory exemptions increased the 
heterogeneity of the funds bearing the hedge fund brand name.113 Therefore, the term hedge fund 
applies to many heterogeneous funds with vastly heterogeneous investment strategies complying by 
some black-letter rules of statutes and regulations.  
3. Addressing regulatory arbitrage: Market limits vs. public policy 
responses 
Casting doubts on the benefits of regulatory competition, viewing regulatory arbitrage as a potential 
harmful and sinister phenomenon,114 raising concerns about issues of market fragmentation and 
deglobalization because of divergent policy choices throughout the world (e.g., the Volcker Rule and 
ring fencing),115 and highlighting the gaps between global regulatory institutions and ‘truly global 
finance’116 led to new policy recommendations in favor of harmonization, centralization and 
consolidation of regulatory regimes to reduce cross-border harms.117 It is argued that regulatory 
arbitrage, though beneficial, limits the ability of regulators to control systemic risk.118 The common 
denominator for such proposals is the mitigation of systemic risks of hedge funds. 
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On the other side of the spectrum, it is suggested that such a move toward regulatory harmonization is 
misguided on the grounds that hedge funds were neither the cause of the financial crisis, nor is it 
likely that they cause one in the future.119 Indeed, regulatory consolidation and harmonization may 
result in heightened systemic risk, because in a regime of global harmonization, regulators tend to 
adopt similar regulatory strategies and thereby push financial institutions to adopt similar business 
strategies. Deprived of the benefits of diversification, such regulatory systems in which the risks of 
regulatory errors can easily be amplified, could be more prone to systemic risk than the risks 
embedded in a decentralized regulatory regime. Within this line of argument, regulatory arbitrage can 
be seen as a buffer against systemic regulatory and market failures.120  
More generally, empirical findings confirm the intuition that effective corporate and securities laws 
are the product of regulatory competition or competitive legal systems, embracing bottom-up legal 
innovations and experimentation, rather than the top-down approach by the regulators who are 
detached from the day-to-day operations of financial firms.121 Given the benefits of regulatory 
competition, to curb regulatory arbitrage, increased harmonization is not the first-best solution and it 
might produce unintended consequences. On the contrary, mitigating potential risks of regulatory 
arbitrage requires the shift of focus from regulatory harmonization to the quality of regulation within 
each and every individual regulatory regime encapsulated in the globally-fragmented regulatory 
system. Such a balanced approach can deliver the benefits of regulatory competition, and in the 
meantime can limit regulatory arbitrage of a kind that may result in regulatory race-to-the-bottom.  
The rest of this article studies the ability of market forces in addressing the potential negative 
externalities of regulatory arbitrage. This article will further elaborate why due to legal placebo 
effects, higher attrition rates among hedge funds and opaqueness of the hedge fund industry, markets, 
left to their own devices, cannot address potential risks and externalities arising from regulatory 
arbitrage by hedge funds.  
3.1. Do markets limit regulatory arbitrage? 
All being said about potential benefits of regulatory competition, the demand for regulatory services is 
a function of, among other things, the demand by the financial institutions’ counterparties, creditors 
and investors for safety and soundness of financial institutions they are dealing with. For example, if 
investors demand more protection, the firms will try to show that they can better provide it with 
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registering with a well-known regulator who provides reputation-enhancing regulation. Hedge funds 
in turn will demand good quality regulation offering more guarantees for investor protection. This is 
where the quality of regulation matters. Therefore, there are limits to race-to-the-bottom arising from 
regulatory arbitrage and market forces can, to some extent, mitigate its effects. In other words, the 
firms’ ability to arbitrage between regulatory regimes is constrained by their willingness to be 
subjected to the least credible regulatory regime. In turn, financial institutions willingness to do so is a 
function of, among other things, their investors and counterparties’ willingness to engage in 
transactions with stable financial institutions within reliably stable and credible financial 
infrastructure.122 Therefore, if quality of regulation matters for financial institutions (because of 
reputational concerns), race-to-the-bottom concerns from regulatory arbitrage will be largely 
unfounded.   
Recent empirical studies on regulatory arbitrage by banks find a strong evidence of transfer of funds 
by banks to less regulated markets. This finding holds in spite of controlling for the reverse causality 
(endogenous responsiveness of regulation to capital market flows).123 In addition, strong evidence of 
arbitrage opportunities is documented in the form of banks’ foreign expansion decisions due to the 
“regulatory gaps in activity restriction, capital regulation, supervisory independence and strength, 
external audit, disclosure transparency, and loan classification” in the form of establishing branches or 
subsidiaries in lightly regulated jurisdictions.124 However, these studies suggest that in the absence of 
strong institutional infrastructure and legal environment, such as strong protections for property and 
creditor rights, lax regulation by itself is not sufficient to give rise to massive capital flows from 
heavily-regulated to lightly-regulated jurisdictions, because strong prudential regulations “may serve 
as a signal of quality and stability”. Indeed, these findings demonstrate that “cross-country differences 
in regulations have a much more pronounced effect on bank flows if the recipient country has an 
advanced economy, strong creditor rights, strong property rights, and a high degree of information 
sharing among investors.”125  
Therefore, the importance of the quality of regulation and its effect on regulatory arbitrage mitigates 
the concerns for potential race-to-the-bottom, which is the main concern about regulatory arbitrage. 
Indeed, these empirical works provide confirmation of the theory that regulatory competition will 
result in a separation between countries based on their securities regulatory system. Some 
jurisdictions will cater for managers seeking opportunistic behavior, whereas some others will attract 
managers or issuers seeking to signal credibility and quality. Investors and companies will identify 
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themselves accordingly by registering with those regulators. In turn, a rational investor will discount 
for investing in bad-quality issuers offsetting the risk of opportunistic behavior.126  
In addition, established reputation and credibility of a regulatory jurisdiction can be translated into 
financial premium for the financial institutions regulated by the authorities of that jurisdiction. For 
example, one of the factors that can help banks to build reputation, among other things, is their 
registration with a jurisdiction offering a credible deposit insurance scheme or jurisdiction with 
stricter prudential regulation.127 By the same token, it is argued that competitive threat to U.S. banking 
system from offshore financial centers in the U.S. dollar deposit market is limited by reputational 
considerations.128 Therefore, the quality of regulation is of crucial importance; reputation-enhancing 
regulation is less prone to regulatory arbitrage than the one that is anti-competitive, such as regulation 
imposing interest rate ceilings on loans.129  
3.2. Why are markets ineffective in addressing regulatory arbitrage by 
hedge funds? 
Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the impact of reputation-enhancing regulation on 
regulatory arbitrage by banking entities, less research has been conducted on the importance of 
reputation-enhancing regulation on the regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. Therefore, it is apt to ask 
how much reputation for being regulated by credible regulators matters for hedge funds. The main 
thesis of this paper is that the importance of regulation-induced reputation for different financial firms 
is of asymmetric nature. Therefore, the arguments for regulation as a signal of quality may matter 
more to some firms than the others. This section argues that regulation-induced reputation does not 
matter for hedge funds as much as it matters for financial institutions such as banks, mutual funds, and 
pension funds.  
There are variables that matter for the importance of reputation for hedge funds. Three important 
factors, which contribute to the regulation-induced reputation, will be studied. It will be argued that 
because of less effective ‘placebo effects of laws’, higher attrition rate in the hedge fund industry and 
inherent opaqueness of hedge funds, reputation-induced regulation is of less importance for hedge 
funds compared with mainstream financial institutions. The lower reputational costs of regulation 
make regulatory arbitrage less costly for hedge funds compared with banks, mutual funds, and 
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pension funds. Therefore, it is more likely for hedge funds to engage in regulatory arbitrage than other 
mainstream financial institutions. 
3.2.1. Legal placebo effects and hedge fund reputational concerns 
Introduction of new laws and regulations can change people’s risk perception about the regulated 
activity or entity. In other words, laws have placebo effects. The placebo effect of a law “manipulates 
individuals’ expectations regarding a risk that the law addresses”.130 Such an effect changes the 
welfare of regulated individuals and firms independently of the objective effects of law.131 Legal 
placebo effect can cause a convergence or divergence of the individuals’ perception of the probability 
and magnitude of risks with regard to the objective risk. ‘Positive placebo effect’ of a law occurs 
when prior to the implementation of a law, individuals overestimate a risk and perceive the legislation 
as mitigating that risk.132 In other words, the law’s effect is to reduce the level of perceived risks in 
individuals who overestimate the risks had no legislation been passed. 
The law has an asymmetric effect on the risk perception of individuals and institutions based on their 
level of sophistication. Put differently, legal placebo effects are of asymmetric nature for different 
categories of investors. Therefore, positive placebo effects of laws (the one which reduces the 
overestimated perception of the risk)133 depend on the level of sophistication of regulated entities. For 
institutional, accredited, and qualified investors such an effect is less than that for unsophisticated 
investors whose perception of risk is more prone to manipulation. Based on this analysis, positive 
placebo effects of laws have disproportional effects on hedge funds and banks. This is mostly due to 
the fact that the investor base, counterparties, and creditors of hedge funds are more sophisticated than 
those of banks, mutual funds, and pension funds.134 
Therefore, compared to hedge funds, being subject to regulation by a credible regulator has more 
reputational effects for banks whose clients are unsophisticated investors and do not have adequate 
resources at their disposal to assess the true risks of these institutions. This implies that there is a 
heightened incentive for mainstream financial institutions such as banks, mutual funds, and pension 
funds, which deal with unsophisticated investors on a daily basis, to signal to their investors and 
depositors about their safety and soundness by registering with credible regulators. However, there are 
no such amplified incentives for hedge funds because such a registration with a credible regulator 
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cannot dramatically manipulate the risk perception of hedge funds’ sophisticated investors, creditors, 
and counterparties. This means that regulation-induced reputation matters less for hedge funds and 
hence they can relatively easily engage in regulatory arbitrage.  
3.2.2. Attrition rate in the hedge fund industry and reputational 
concerns 
Studies in game theory suggest that repeated interactions are prerequisite for the emergence of 
evolutionary cooperation based on reputation. On the contrary, limited future interactions breed 
opportunistic behavior. Reputational concerns constitute the most important factor incentivizing 
hedge funds not to take refuge in less-credible financial jurisdictions signaling bad quality. However, 
hedge funds display an extraordinarily high level of attrition rate compared to mainstream financial 
institutions such as banks, mutual funds, and pension funds.135 Because of high attrition rates among 
hedge funds, they have relatively shorter time horizons and one-dimensional relationships with their 
counterparties and regulators. Such limited future interactions mitigate the effects of reputational 
concerns and market discipline, and increase the likelihood of their opportunistic behavior.  
There is a widespread concern in the literature on corporate governance with regard to hedge fund 
short-termism.136 Short-termism occurs in inter-temporal choices. These choices are usually made by 
“decisions in which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out over time”.137 The dispersion of 
costs and benefits over time accompanied by the conflicts of interest of the principals and agents in an 
economic firm highlight the importance of the short and long-term horizons, which might result in 
compromising long-term greater benefits for smaller short-term benefits. Even in the absence of 
conflicts of interest, managers or economic agents might suffer from myopia making difficult for 
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them to accurately assess the long-term consequences of their decisions.138 Increased hedge fund 
activism, though beneficial for corporate governance and performance of firms,139 gave rise to 
concerns about hedge funds’ short termism with regard to the corporate governance of the firms they 
acquire.140 Though a concrete and fully-entrenched case for hedge fund short-termism is yet to be 
made,141 concerns has been raised about the harms that hedge funds might cause while pursuing their 
own self-interest.142  
The high attrition rate among hedge funds can contribute to a tendency of being short-sighted and 
hence create incentives for opportunistic behavior in hedge funds as they approach the end-game, a 
stage in repeated interactions that undermines the reputational effects. Hence, due to this higher 
attrition rate, hedge funds will not be as strongly subject to market discipline as their counterparties 
and creditors. Commercial and investment banks, mutual funds, and other financial institutions with 
lower attrition rate often have multi-dimensional financial relationships with other market participants 
and regulators. This long-term relationship often engenders much stronger reputational effects for 
these institutions, reduces their incentive to behave opportunistically and misuse the standard market 
conventions to their advantage. On the contrary, hedge funds “typically have a single-product 
business with the sole focus of maximising returns from trading in financial markets, and as such are 
subject to fewer constraints than other institutions. Hedge funds are also able to have more 
concentrated portfolios than other institutions, so that for a given portfolio size, they are able to obtain 
larger positions in individual markets, and to change those positions more quickly. The result is that 
they can be completely opportunistic when it suits them.”143  
Higher attrition rate among hedge funds and their shorter time horizons undermine the importance of 
reputation for hedge funds. Therefore, it seems that the importance of the regulation-induced 
reputation in the decision to engage in regulatory arbitrage is of less concern to hedge funds than to 
well-established and reputation-sensitive financial institutions such as banks and mutual funds. 
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3.2.3. Transparency and reputational concerns in the hedge fund 
industry 
In transparent markets reputation matters more than it does in opaque markets. Information disclosure 
can enhance or damage the reputation of firms in transparent markets faster than it does in opaque 
markets.144 Therefore, transparency enhances the importance of reputation, and the importance of 
(regulation-induced) reputational costs decreases the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage to less-
reputable jurisdictions. However, due to lower reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge 
funds (because of the absence of mandatory disclosure to markets), it is less costly for hedge funds to 
engage in regulatory arbitrage compared with other mainstream financial institutions, which are 
subject to mandatory disclosure. 
The importance of information in the market has long been discussed in economic literature. It has 
been well established how information asymmetry can result in market failure.145 The transparency 
deficit and asymmetric information is especially problematic in financial markets because of higher 
information asymmetry stemming from the nature of financial products and the inter-temporal nature 
of financial transactions.146 Most financial services, especially those concerning financial and 
investment advice, are credence goods the quality of which are not ascertainable even after the 
purchase and use.147 It is argued that in experience and credence goods, which have the highest level 
of information asymmetry, mandatory information disclosure requirements can significantly mitigate 
the likelihood of market failure.148 In addition, the importance of trust and reputation in inter-temporal 
financial transactions has long been discussed.149 The inter-temporal aspects of a transaction 
exacerbate information asymmetries. For example, banks are less willing to lend for longer periods of 
time and depositors are less willing to deposit their money in a financial institution from which they 
cannot withdraw in a short notice (longer luck-ups).150 Therefore, the level of lending will be far 
lower than its socially optimal level. In this setting, transparency and information disclosure can help 
mitigate information asymmetry and help reduce funding costs of financial institutions. Therefore, 
                                                     
144 There is a positive relationship between transparency and reputation, and a negative relationship between reputational 
costs and arbitrage behavior of firms. 
145 George A. Akerlof, 'The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism' (1970) 84 The Quarterly 
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being a well-known, reputable, and trustworthy borrower is essential for attracting, concentrating, and 
channeling dispersed investors’ savings into economically productive activities.151  
The most effective mechanisms for enhancing trust in financial markets are registration and disclosure 
requirements, which are at the same time the main mechanisms for enhancing transparency. In 
addition to firm-specific benefits of disclosure in terms of enhanced liquidity for firms’ stocks, it 
benefits markets too. Market benefits of the information disclosure include enhanced liquidity, lower 
cost of capital, and better firm valuation.152 One of the firmly acknowledged firm-specific benefits of 
disclosure is the effect of disclosure on the market liquidity.153 In the absence of reliable information 
disclosure system in financial markets, the uninformed investors cannot tell the ‘lemons’ from the 
‘peaches’. Therefore, to hedge against possible losses from trading with informed investors, market 
participants will discount the purchase price of the stock and increase its selling price, reflecting the 
probability of trading with an informed counterparty multiplied by the potential information surplus of 
the counterparty. This increased bid-ask spread will decrease liquidity for a particular stock.154 As 
Akerlof predicts, such an instance of asymmetric information will even lead to the collapse of the 
entire market for that product.155  
However, even in unregulated markets, high-performing firms have incentive to disclose to signal the 
quality and distinguish themselves from poorly-performing firms.156 However, the main reason for 
market failure in providing optimal level of information is the problem of externalities. Despite being 
socially optimal, information disclosure might not be privately optimal for a specific firm.157 Similar 
to the problem of commons or ‘impure public goods’ nature of information, this problem exists due to 
the externalities arising from non-excludability of information when it is out at large in the market. In 
the context of information disclosure, such externalities drive a wedge between privately and socially-
optimal levels of disclosure. As an example, Admati and Pfleiderer show that in a model of voluntary 
disclosure by firms in financial markets, externalities arise when firm values are correlated. In such a 
setting, the costly disclosure of one firm can be used in valuation of other firms and hence can 
generate free-rider problem.158 In other words, such disclosure can help the competitors of disclosing 
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firm while hurting the issuer.159 In this case, they demonstrate that the amount of disclosure is often 
suboptimal and there is a scope for disclosure regulation to improve social welfare.160 In addition, 
Fishman and Hagerty argue that mandatory disclosure is necessary in markets in which the 
information about the product is relatively difficult to understand.161 As mentioned above, since 
financial products and services are credence goods, this argument can readily be applied to financial 
services.  
On the other hand, maintaining trust in inter-temporal transactions can be considered as public goods 
and leaving it to the forces of markets can result in its under-provision. The trust deficit162 in financial 
markets calls for government intervention, as it does in other sectors of the economy. Aghion et al. 
demonstrate that in the cross section of countries, higher distrust breeds higher level of government 
intervention even though the subjects know that the government itself is corrupt.163 Among financial 
institutions, hedge funds and hedge fund products have an established reputation for complexity and 
opaqueness. Such opaqueness intensifies the trust deficit and the amplified information asymmetry in 
hedge fund products. Therefore, notwithstanding the theories arguing that voluntary disclosure itself 
is a separating equilibrium,164 such a signaling mechanism by firms might become too costly because 
of the externalities involved in the voluntary disclosure setting. Regarding hedge funds, the 
proprietary nature of the information exacerbates this problem and hinders more information 
disclosure. 
On the other hand, there are additional reasons for hedge funds’ non-disclosure; which can convolute 
the signaling effect of disclosure and further dissuade hedge funds from voluntary disclosure. Some 
hedge funds might be saturated by investors’ money and cannot technically take more investment. 
Accordingly, they may stop disclosing information. On the other hand, some hedge funds might not 
disclose information because of the regulatory limits on the number of their investors. In addition, the 
prohibition on hedge fund public solicitation further decreases hedge funds’ incentives to disclose 
information.165 Since disclosure to a certain extent, might be considered as public solicitation, it may 
trigger the automatic application of otherwise dormant rules to hedge funds. Therefore, not only do 
hedge funds have no incentive to disclose, but also certain statutory provisions prohibit or discourage 
them from disclosing, thereby refuting the optimality of voluntary disclosure in the hedge funds 
regulation context. Moreover, under the voluntary disclosure mechanism, there is a likelihood that 
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some hedge funds might disclose information opportunistically (i.e., disclosing less valuable 
information which already lost its value) or they may cherry pick and disclose the information 
accordingly. Since all these factors will discourage the disclosure of information, disclosure will lose 
its signaling effect. Therefore, disclosing firms will not be rewarded by more money from investors. 
To summarize the argument, the main market mechanism, which can inhibit regulatory arbitrage, is 
the reputational effect arising from the regulatory infrastructure such as regulation offering adequate 
protections for property rights, creditor rights, and reliable disclosure mechanisms. Indeed, reputation, 
which is induced by regulation, is a compensation for the costs of regulation for regulated firms and 
will keep regulated firms where they are, instead of encouraging them to migrate to other 
jurisdictions. However, in the absence of mandatory disclosure system for hedge funds, no regulatory 
scheme and jurisdiction can be credible enough to signal quality and hence cannot inhibit the race-to-
the-bottom. Therefore, the firms registered in those jurisdictions will not enjoy a premium because the 
regulation cannot sufficiently enhance reputational benefits. A regulatory regime, which generates no 
reputational benefit for the regulated industry to compensate the costs of regulation, is especially 
prone to regulatory arbitrage. Since the lack of transparency lowers the reputational costs of 
regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds, it will be more likely for hedge funds to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage than their mainstream counterparts.  
4. Public policy responses to regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds  
To address the problems associated with regulatory arbitrage several proposals have been put forward. 
These proposals range from equivalence requirements,166 strengthening regulatory coordination,167 
cooperation, regulatory co-opetition,168 regulatory harmonization, to regulatory consolidation,169 and 
unification,170 perhaps leading to the creation of a World Financial Organization (WFO) akin to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO),171 or a Global Economic Council (Gleco) for overssing the proper 
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functioning of the gloal economy and the stability of the international financial system.172 Although 
regulatory globalization can only address the cross-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, it will fall short 
of addressing intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage arising from definitional problems. Based on the 
idiosyncratic features of the hedge fund industry, this paper proposes an approach that can mitigate 
the negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage regardless of the arbitrage opportunity being intra-
jurisdictional or inter-jurisdictional. 
Given the benefits of regulatory competition, which presupposes some degree of regulatory arbitrage, 
the optimal amount of regulatory arbitrage is not zero. Therefore, the aim is to maximize the benefits 
of regulatory arbitrage such as enhancing regulatory competition while minimizing its externalities. 
As discussed earlier in the debate about regulatory competition, regulatory arbitrage facilitates the 
formation of a meta-market for legal and regulatory regimes within which it is possible to trade 
regulatory regimes. In such a market, regulation itself is a commodity and hedge funds will shop for 
different regulatory regimes. They will buy into the system when they are satisfied that the marginal 
cost of a regulatory regime equals or is less than its marginal benefit. Therefore, while the initial 
intention of regulation is to regulate markets, regulatory arbitrage provides opportunities for firms to 
regulate and affect behavioral changes in regulators. It follows that addressing the problems of 
regulatory arbitrage does not necessarily mean its total elimination, for it would be neither possible, 
not optimal. 
To address regulatory arbitrage, special attention should be paid to the incentive effects arising from 
the costs of regulation; meaning that the regulation, which imposes additional costs to the regulated 
industry, should off-set those costs by offering the industry benefits of being regulated by a specific 
regulator. Ceteris paribus, the regulatory system in which the marginal benefit of regulation equals its 
marginal costs will be arbitrage-proof.173 Therefore, the design of financial regulatory regime should 
result in an equilibrium from which hedge funds have no incentive to deviate without making 
themselves worse-off.  
The immediate conceivable benefit of regulation for regulated firms is the reputational benefits that 
registering with certain regulators can create for financial institutions. However, regulation-induced 
reputation will not be sufficient to hinder hedge funds from regulatory arbitrage. In other words, 
reputational benefits from being regulated by credible regulators are not sufficient to offset the costs 
of regulation, thereby inducing hedge funds to arbitrage between regulatory systems. Since the 
reputational effects of regulation cannot suffice to offset the costs, the regulation should be designed 
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within to impose as minimal costs as possible on hedge funds or otherwise offset the costs by offering 
countervailing benefits. 
Following the underlying efficiency criterion and incentive compatibility of hedge fund regulation, 
regulators should provide the sector, which is negatively affected by regulation, with incentives to 
stay within the limits of regulations. One of the examples of such an exclusive advantage offered for 
regulated entities is illustrated in the banking industry. Traditionally, the banking sector is heavily 
regulated. To offset the costs of such heavy regulations, regulators granted monopoly on certain 
financial transactions to banks by offering them valuable bank charters. The logic of granting bank 
charters is to protect the banking industry from outside competition, hence giving them sufficient 
countervailing benefits (subsidies) vis-à-vis the costs of heavier regulation.174  
The banking history shows that the advent of the shadow banking sector and accompanying loss of 
bank charter value posed several challenges to banks. First, a decrease in bank charter value induced 
more risk-taking behavior by banks. Prior to the loss of charter value, the charter by itself was 
considered a valuable asset for banks and the loss of the charter in the incident of insolvency was one 
of the factors that incentivized banks to take less risk. However, with decreasing charter value, banks 
tended to take more risks, because the threat of the loss of valuable bank charter was removed 
altogether.175 And second, the diminishing value of the bank charter was one of the major reasons for 
banking disintermediation and the rise of shadow banking.176  
A more recent example of such offsetting benefits could be found in the Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers Directive (AIFMD). This Directive introduces the passport mechanism for hedge funds, 
which enables them to market their products throughout Europe by registration with a EU Member 
State. Introduction of such a mechanism is best understood as an offsetting mechanism for heavier 
regulation of hedge funds under the AIFMD with the aim of preventing relocation of European hedge 
funds to other loosely regulated jurisdictions. However, it remains to be seen how effective it will be 
in preventing hedge fund regulatory arbitrage or even in attracting new hedge funds to Europe. To be 
sure, such benefits will be measured against regulatory costs which are imposed on hedge funds by 
such strict regulations. It seems that it is only by creating competitive edge or subsidizing regulated 
entities that regulators can ensure that regulated entities will not engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
Otherwise, the competitive pressure from the lightly-regulated financial institutions will generate 
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positional externalities177 and will incentivize more and more financial institutions to shift their 
business to lightly-regulated financial jurisdictions. 
In the next section, this article argues that the indirect regulation of hedge funds through banking 
entities, which are already heavily regulated, will impose minimum cost possible on the hedge fund 
industry. This will make it redundant for the regulators to devise regulations, which would create 
additional benefits for the hedge fund industry to create an equilibrium from which hedge funds do 
not have incentives to deviate. There are two main rationales for shifting the focus from hedge funds 
to banks for the purpose of regulating hedge funds. First, since banking entities are already heavily 
subsidized, the cost of indirect regulation of hedge funds by banking entities would be set-off by the 
already existing subsidies within the banking industry. Second, taking advantage of the indirect 
regulatory measures is especially important in a time in which granting even the slightest 
countervailing benefits to the hedge fund industry might provoke public outrage. 
4.1. Indirect regulation and addressing regulatory arbitrage by hedge 
funds 
One of the controversial debates fueled by the recent crisis was the debate about whether to regulate 
hedge funds directly or indirectly.178 On the one hand, there were the U.S. and UK regulators, and the 
hedge fund industry itself supporting the indirect regulation of hedge funds through regulated banks. 
On the other hand, there was the European Union supporting the direct regulatory framework for 
hedge funds. This divergence of opinion was deepened by the events at the time of global financial 
crisis such as the accusations of hedge funds’ abusive short-selling practices. In the end, the clash of 
the two opposing views resulted in a compromise. It seems that one of the factors giving rise to such a 
compromise was increasingly stringent attitude in the U.S. toward hedge fund regulation after the 
change of administration.179 This change of policy in the U.S. paved the way for the realization of the 
European views on hedge fund regulation. The efforts to rein in hedge funds culminated in the G20 
London Summit in April 2009 in which all parties agreed that hedge funds and their advisers should 
be subject to the mandatory registration and disclosure requirements.180 Nevertheless, this paper 
argues that indirect regulation can better address the problems from hedge fund regulatory arbitrage.  
The commands of law directed to creating behavioral change in its subjects, can be applied directly or 
indirectly. ‘Direct’ or ‘entity’ regulation includes “regulatory measures focusing on the regulation of 
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industry itself (as a discrete activity or as part of the broader, regulated investment services 
universe.)”181 In contrast, indirect regulation is a type of regulation the imperatives or commands of 
which is mediated by or transmitted through an intermediary to the (primarily intended) regulated 
entity or activity. Indeed, as referred to hedge funds, indirect regulation involves the situation in 
which regulators directly regulate the financial institutions, which provide financial services to hedge 
funds or hedge fund counterparties, and in turn those institutions oversee hedge funds.182 In other 
words, direct regulation means that regulation is directed to the hedge fund entity itself or to the 
activities directly or immediately conducted by hedge funds. In contrast, ‘indirect regulation’ is 
“market discipline-inspired regulatory measures targeting the creditors and counterparties of hedge 
funds (mainly, but not exclusively, their prime brokers and securities brokers).”183 Therefore, a key 
element in indirect approach is the regulator’s reliance on market participants, namely the investors, 
creditors, and counterparties to reward well-managed firms and to punish poorly-managed ones.184 
There are several reasons why hedge funds direct regulation cannot effectively address potential 
hedge fund externalities.185 The regulatory arbitrage generating effect of direct regulation is one of the 
repeatedly-pronounced arguments against hedge fund direct regulation.186 Indeed, one of the primary 
concerns discouraging direct regulation of hedge funds is the concern that not only will the imposition 
of direct regulation result in competitive disadvantage for the jurisdiction imposing the rule, but also it 
will lead to the offshore relocation of hedge funds. This is largely because hedge funds, similar to 
other corporate entities, have an exit option and will ‘vote with their feet’.187 This relocation has its 
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adverse consequences for regulators and the jurisdiction involved. It can deprive the rule-imposing 
jurisdiction from the tax revenues coming from hedge funds and job opportunities created by them. 
Indeed, the fear of hedge fund relocation was one of the factors that played a role in the regulatory 
forbearance in imposing stricter rules on hedge funds prior to the financial crisis.188 
Therefore, since regulation cannot offer substantial reputational benefits (subsidies) for hedge funds, 
those benefits are unlikely to offset the costs of direct regulation. In order to effectively address the 
potential systemic risks of hedge funds, with an eye to minimizing the opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage, the optimal method is to indirectly regulate them through their prime brokers, executing 
brokers, investment managers and advisers, and imposing certain regulatory qualifications on hedge 
fund investors and their investments.189 
In addition, because of the value of the proprietary information for hedge funds, it seems implausible 
to suggest the imposition of mandatory disclosure as a means of direct regulation. Furthermore, 
voluntary disclosure involves externalities and such externalities inhibit the optimal provision of 
information by hedge funds. Thus, indirect regulation of hedge funds can better address these 
problems due to the fact that banks and prime brokers are already subject to mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  
Furthermore, the implications of the discussions on regulatory capture, theory of tournament and the 
efficiency of regulatory competition for hedge fund regulation is that delegating hedge fund regulation 
to the counterparties of hedge funds not only decreases the chances of regulatory capture, but also 
increases the efficiency of regulation by providing incentives to regulators to compete with each 
other. Furthermore, since indirect regulation of hedge funds will be implemented by different multiple 
prime brokers, it provides for the possibility of decentralized implementation and enforcement of 
rules which are initially applied to the banking sector.190  
It might be argued that such an indirect regulation will impose additional restrictions on hedge funds 
counterparties and thereby causing certain regulatory arbitrage opportunities for hedge funds’ prime 
brokers and other counterparties. However, banks as the only deposit-taking institutions are heavily 
sensitive to reputational considerations (especially the reputation enhanced by registering with a 
regulator providing strong and credible deposit insurance) than hedge funds. Accordingly, the costs of 
regulatory arbitrage for them is more than its costs for hedge funds. On the other hand, given the 
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relatively more harmonized international regulatory framework for banks191 which are the main 
counterparties of hedge funds, regulatory arbitrage by banks would be of less systemic significance 
than regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. 
Conclusion  
The interplay and dynamics of financial regulation and hedge funds’ responses to such regulation can 
culminate in regulatory arbitrage in the global financial markets and its fragmented regulatory regime. 
This paper argues that the differential regulation of homogenous financial activities giving rise to 
regulatory fragmentation is the main source of regulatory arbitrage. However, the differential 
regulatory treatment is not a necessary evil; instead, it may often yield more efficient outcomes than 
its alternatives (i.e., consolidated regulatory regime) do in certain market settings. This paper focuses 
on regulatory competition as a driving force for differential regulatory treatment of homogenous 
financial activities, which can lead to regulatory arbitrage by creating a fragmented regulatory scheme 
and dual system of governance. 
There are market limits to regulatory arbitrage. For example, empirical studies suggest that regulatory 
arbitrage is limited by reputational effects. Legal infrastructure, which signals quality, plays an 
important role in the relocation decisions of financial firms preventing a race-to-the-bottom. 
Nevertheless, such an argument cannot plausibly be applied to hedge funds. The level of 
sophistication in the investor base of the hedge fund industry inhibits legal placebo effects that could 
otherwise amplify the impact of regulation-enhanced reputation. Furthermore, hedge funds’ higher 
attrition rate and limited transparency can also diminish the reputational and credibility costs for 
hedge funds. Such indiscernible reputational costs facilitate hedge fund regulatory arbitrage and does 
not disincentives hedge funds from engaging regulatory arbitrage. Therefore, this paper argued that to 
reduce the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the strategies 
for regulating hedge funds should focus on regulating hedge funds indirectly through their 
counterparties, creditors and investors for whom reputational costs are significantly higher than hedge 
funds. The theoretical framework and recommendations put forward in this study can easily lend 
themselves to empirical tests, especially in an era in which hedge funds are coming out of the shadow 
due to the information discourse obligations imposed by the post-crisis financial reforms on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
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